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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the broader business law literature, much has been written on the supposed 
convergence trend of corporate governance practices. Yet this academic discussion has barely 
extended to the professional sports context and in the instances where professional sports 
governance has been at issue, stadiums and stadium ownership have not been the subject of 
analysis. With stadium construction and renovation projects regularly running into the hundreds 
of millions or billions of dollars,1 and ongoing stadium operations and debt repayments on such 
facilities often exceeding tens of millions each year,2 stadium governance is a significant aspect 
of business and corporate governance worth illuminating. This article aims to contribute to the 
closing of this literature gap.  
Although there are many prospective paths of inquiry, this study focuses on stadium 
ownership structures in four wealthy Anglosphere jurisdictions with a substantial professional 
sports and stadium presence: England, the United States, Canada, and Australia. Beginning with 
the baseline of the English Premier League as a proxy for England, and continuing with a 
comparative examination primarily focused on the National Football League (NFL), Major 
League Soccer (MLS), Canadian Football League (CFL), Australian Football League (AFL), and 
A-League, this study evaluates 114 stadium ownership structures. After a literature review on 
corporate governance convergence trends, stadium finance, and motivations for stadium 
construction, I move to a descriptive overview of the stadium holding structure data set. This is 
followed by the core discussion of a number of legal influences on stadium ownership as well as 
the relationship of stadium ownership to club controlled ancillary real estate development. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Corporate governance policy and trends 
The literature concerning corporate governance convergence has primarily focused on 
private and publicly traded corporations and the institutional frameworks governing them at the 
national and international level.3 Research has broadly concerned the adoption of corporate 
governance codes, legal or regulatory reform (such as requirements for outside directors, 
disclosure, and minority shareholder protection), and market trends (including CEO options, 
takeovers, and institutional investors).4   
At the national level, Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu differentiate between de jure and de 
facto convergence, with the former referring to institutions and laws and the latter to the practical 
implementation of governance.5 Along somewhat similar lines, Gilson divides convergence into 
three primary types – functional, formal, and contractual.6  For Gilson, functional convergence 
 
1 JUDITH GRANT LONG, PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS FACILITIES (2013). 
2 Id at 101. 
3 Toru Yoshikawa and Abdul Rasheed, Convergence of Corporate Governance: Critical Review and Future 
Directions, 17 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 388 (2009).  
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 389. 
6 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J COMP. L 329 
(2001). 
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entails governance responses within already existing institutional frameworks that are 
sufficiently flexible to withstand such changes.7 For institutions without this built in elasticity, 
convergence is operationalized though formal means.8 Finally, with institutional arrangements 
that are neither internally flexible, nor amenable to change through the political process, there is 
contractual convergence.9 The flipside of these convergence concepts – outlined by Meyer and 
Rowan,10 and Fiss and Zajac,11 and Yoshikawa and Rasheed12 – is so-called decoupling, whereby 
the illusion of convergence is attained or claimed by a country, but the substance of practice does 
not support this claim.13   
  Convergence has been explained at the firm and exchange levels through financial market 
integration, portfolio integration, and product market integration.14 Others have focused on the 
harmonization of accounting rules and governance codes.15 Still the convergence trend has not 
been a one-way flow. Some academics view convergence as being impeded by a lack of 
consensus on what the ideal governance regime is in the first place,16 as well as divergent forces 
such as path dependency,17 rent seeking interest groups,18 or differing property rights regimes. 
Often however, convergence has been framed as moving towards an “Anglo-American” model, 
although even within this dominant thread, some have noted significant distinctions.19  
In the realm of stadium related corporations there is a somewhat different range of forces 
present. Compared to firms in OECD marketplaces generally, and as this article will document, 
stadium related corporations are more likely to be state owned enterprises or public-private 
partnerships. At the firm level, while there are similar imperatives for implementing transparency 
measures, or seeing governance from outside directors, other market issues – such as executive 
compensation, takeovers, minority protection, and institutional investors – are for obvious 
reasons less present, or absent altogether. At the national level however, there would seem to be 
similar incentives for how stadiums should be held: from an efficiency standpoint, success with a 
particular model of governance for comparable stadium projects should make a particular public 
or private ownership structure more or less common within a country and across national 
borders.  
 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structures as Myth and Ceremony, 
AM. J SOCIOLOGY (1977). 
11 Peer C. Fiss and E.J. Zajac, The Diffusion of Ideas Over Contested Terrain: The (Non)adoption of a Shareholder 
Value Orientation Among German Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q 504 (2004). 
12 Yoshikawa and Rasheed, supra note 3. 
13 Id. 
14 Yoshikawa and Rasheed, supra note 3. 
15 John C. Coffee, The Future As History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications, 93 Nw. U.L. Rev. 641 (1999).  
16 Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen, Nationality and ownership structures: The 100 largest companies in six 
European nations, MIR: MANAGEMENT INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 149 (1996). 
17 DOUGLASS NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005); Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
supra note 3. 
18 Coffee, supra note 15. 
19 Steven Toms and Mike Wright, Divergence and Convergence within Anglo-American Corporate Governance 
Systems: Evidence from the US and UK, 1950–2000, 47 BUSINESS HISTORY 267 (2005). 
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While the dearth of literature on stadium governance allows for many prospective aspects 
through which the subject could be addressed, this project focuses on stadium ownership 
structures. At the national level however, there would seem to be similar incentives for how 
stadiums should be held: success with a particular governance model for comparable stadium 
projects should make a given ownership structure more or less common within and across 
borders. While some work has theorized sport partnership governance,20 or the mechanics of 
governance in a sport infrastructure context,21 this project focuses on how law influences the 
structural landscape of stadium ownership with reference to supposed convergence trends in a 
broader corporate governance law literature. 
B. Stadium finance 
Although there is a significant gap in the literature as it pertains to stadium governance 
after the facility development or redevelopment project is complete and the venue is in the 
operational phase, much has been written on stadium finance in North America. This aspect of 
the literature is important to understanding much of the context surrounding post-construction 
governance in the baseline jurisdiction of this paper, England, as well as the three comparator 
countries.  
In North America, stadiums receive heavy public subsidies. Long’s detailed accounting 
of public-private stadium partnerships in North America highlights that public partners paid 
almost 64 percent of NFL stadium capital costs between 1990 and 2009.22 There are several 
explanations for this subsidization phenomena. First, despite being thoroughly discredited, some 
governments might see stadiums as economic boons.23 Second, governments can see stadiums as 
agents of urban or neighborhood renewal.24 Even if arguments of net economic gains in a region 
fall flat on the face of significant literature to the contrary, more nuanced arguments can be made 
that a stadium can rearrange regional economic activity and revitalize a particular geographic 
area.25  
A third important explanation for North American stadium subsidies is jurisdictional 
competition. Building off of Tiebout’s basic theory of local expenditure,26 sports teams and the 
stadiums they play in are an amenity that jurisdictions may subsidize in order to compete with 
other alternative jurisdictions in which firms and talent may wish to locate.27 This competition is 
 
20 See Ian McDonald, Theorising Partnerships: Governance, Communicative Action and Sport Policy, 34 J SOC. 
POL’Y 579 (2005); NEIL KING, SPORT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE (2009); Jonathan Grix & Lesley Phillpots, 
Revisiting the ‘Governance Narrative’; ‘Asymmetrical Network Governance’ and the Deviant Case of the Sports 
Policy Sector, 26 PUB. POL’Y & ADMIN. 3 (2011); Lesley Phillpots et al., Centralized Grassroots Sport Policy and 
‘New Governance’: A Case Study of County Sports Partnerships in the UK–Unpacking the Paradox, 46 INT’L REV. 
SOC. SPORT 265 (2011). 
21 See Russell Hoye & Matthew Nicholson, Sport Stadia Governance, 13 SPORT MGMT. REV. 171 (2010); Martijn 
Van den Hurk & Koen Verhoest, The Governance of Public–Private Partnerships in Sports Infrastructure: 
Interfering Complexities in Belgium, 33 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT. 201 (2015). 
22 Long, supra note 1 at 110-115. 
23 See ROBERT BAADE AND VICTOR MATHESON, FINANCING PROFESSIONAL SPORTS FACILITIES (2011). 
24 Id.  
25 Mark Rosentraub, Sports Facilities and Urban Redevelopment: Private and Public Benefits and a Prescription for 
a Healthier Future, 1 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 212 (2006). 
26 Charles M.Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J POLI ECON. 416 (1956). 
27 See Kevin Delaney and Rick Eckstein, Local Growth Coalitions, Publicly Subsidized Sports Stadiums, and Social 
Inequality." 30 HUMANITY & SOC. 84 (2006). 
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effective in attracting such significant public subsidies because of a fourth and related 
explanation: the monopoly power and artificial scarcity of professional sports teams in North 
America.28 The five major North American sports leagues (MLB, MLS, NBA, NFL, and NHL) 
are effective monopolies, which allows the supply of teams to be limited to a level below 
demand.29 Combined with the ability for successful relocation of teams, leagues can leverage this 
artificially reduced supply to extract substantial stadium subsidies for the privilege of hosting a 
team.30  
From this status quo of heavy American stadium subsidies for professional sports, a norm 
that has been largely matched within the large and rich Anglosphere by Canada and Australia, 
one might expect the second largest jurisdiction with the only sports league that can match the 
NFL in revenue to also converge to this norm in much the same way convergence has been a 
trend in Anglo-American corporate law and governance. However, other factors have proven 
more instructive in understanding stadium ownership structures. 
 
III. ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE 
The Premier League is the first division of professional soccer in England and Wales. 
The League is a private limited company (PLC) with its 20 shares held by its current members.31 
Relegated clubs transfer their shares to clubs promoted from the second division Championship 
at the end of the season.32 Unlike North American leagues, European soccer leagues such as the 
Premier League operate on a promotion and relegation system whereby bottom finishers are 
relegated to the second division league and an equal number of top finishers are promoted to the 
first division.  
To evaluate stadium holding structures in England, this study focuses on the Premier 
League. However, given the promotion and relegation structure, it is necessary to evaluate teams 
beyond the current composition of the Premier League. To this end, I have collected a data set of 
34 soccer stadiums in England and Wales. This data set includes stadiums in three primary 
categories: the stadium of every Premier League club for the 2017-2018 season, the stadiums of 
clubs relegated in the previous three years, as well as stadiums of clubs that participated in the 
Premier League in three of the previous ten seasons. For these last two categories, only stadiums 
with a capacity of at least 20,000 were included. In addition to the three primary categories, I 
have included the national team’s home, Wembley, the largest stadium in the country. 
The data set includes select clubs beyond the current makeup of the Premier League to 
capture the dynamics of promotion and relegation – namely to analyze if there are trends specific 
to clubs that have regularly been in the promotion (Championship to Premier League) and 
relegation (Premier League to Championship) zones. Indeed the most commonly listed business 
risk in the financial statements for clubs outside of the so-called “top six” in the Premier League 
 
28 Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 About the Premier League, ENGLISH PREMIER LEAGUE, https://www.premierleague.com/about.  
32 Id.  
170
DePaul J. Sports Law, Volume 16, Issue 1 
 
 
(Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester City, Manchester United, and Tottenham) was 
relegation and the substantial loss of revenues associated with relegation.  
For each stadium in the data set, I collected three key variables: the ultimate owner of the 
stadium, the stadium’s corporate structure, and the original purpose for which the stadium was 
constructed or, in the case of older facilities, substantially renovated. To collect the first two 
variables, I ascertained the financial statements for each club in this data set from Companies 
House.33 A primary benefit of centering this study on England is that all firms must make their 
financial statements publicly available through Companies House. 
From reviewing the notes in the most recent financial statements, I was able isolate the 
ultimate controlling parties of the clubs, whether the stadium was owned by the same corporation 
as the team, as well as the general holding structure of club and stadium. If this review revealed 
that stadium and club ownership was not one and the same, the notes typically also described 
controlling companies as well as companies that the club company itself had controlling interests 
in. If the club-controlled entities were not related to the stadium holding firm, then the notes 
generally showed what firm or entity the club was leasing the stadium from. For the third 
variable, a review of media sources and official stadium websites provided historical overview of 
the stadium and the primary reasons motivating stadium construction.  
Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity† Owner Structure Purpose  Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Anfield 54,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
Ashton Gate 27,000 Club PLCD; within 
holding 
Club Yes No 
bet365 Stadium 30,000 Club PLCS; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes No 
Bolton Stadium 28,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes Yes 
Cardiff City Stadium 32,000 Club PLCD;  Club Yes Yes 
Carrow Road 27,000 Club PLCD;  Club Yes No 
Craven Cottage  25,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
DW Stadium 25,000 Club PLCD; lease 
land 
Club Yes No 
Emirates Stadium 60,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes Yes 
Etihad Stadium 54,000 City Direct city 
owned 
C’wealth 
Games 
Yes Yes 
Falmer/AMEX 30,000 Club PLCS; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
 
33 Companies House, DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/. 
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Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity† Owner Structure Purpose  Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Goodison Park 39,000 Club PLCS; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
KCOM Stadium 25,000 City Direct city 
owned 
Club No No 
King Power Stadium 32,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes Yes 
Kirklees Stadium 24,000 JV PLC  Club, rugby Yes Yes 
Liberty 20,000 City Direct city 
owned 
Club, rugby Yes No 
London Stadium 60,000 City, Public 
Development 
Corp 
LLP Olympics Yes No 
Madejski Stadium 24,000 Club PLCD Club Yes Yes 
Molineux Stadium 31,000 Club PLCD; within 
holding 
Club No No 
Old Trafford 75,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
Pride Park 33,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes Yes 
Riverside Stadium 34,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
Selhurst Park 26,000 Club PLCD; Club Yes No 
Stadium of Light 48,000 Club PLCD; within 
holding 
Club No No 
Stamford Bridge 41,000 Nonprofit PLCS§; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
St Andrews Stadium 29,000 Club PLCD; within 
holding 
Club No No 
St James' Park 52,000 City Direct city 
owned 
Club No No 
St Mary's Stadium 32,000 Club PLCS; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
The Hawthorns 26,000 Club PLCD; Club No No 
Tottenham Hotspur 
Stadium 
62,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club Yes Yes 
Turf Moor 21,000 Club PLCD Club No No 
Vicarage Road 21,000 Club PLCD; 
subsidiary 
Club No No 
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Table 1. English Premier League stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity† Owner Structure Purpose  Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Villa Park 42,000 Club PLCD; within 
holding 
Club No No 
Wembley 90,000 FA PLCD‡ England, FA 
Cup 
Yes No 
†: Stadium capacities in all tables are rounded to the nearest thousand. 
‡: Private Limited Company Direct: PLC directly holding stadium and club. 
§: Private Limited Company Separate: Stadium PLC separate from club PLC. 
 
A. Findings 
Out of the 34 Premier League stadiums covered in this study, 27 are owned by a PLC that 
also holds the primary tenant, or a PLC that is ultimately controlled by the same party as the 
club. Within these 27, there are four primary subcategories. The first, seen in five instances, is 
where the stadium is directly held by a holding company and the club PLC is a subsidiary of the 
holding company (Sunderland’s Stadium of Light, Villa Park, Molineux Stadium, and Ashton 
Gate). The second category represents stadiums held in a PLC separate from the club, but both 
the stadium company and the club company are subsidiaries of the same parent. Four stadiums 
are held this way.  
The third category includes PLCs where the stadium is held by the same company as the 
club, and this unified firm is not a subsidiary of another controlling company, but rather 
controlled by natural person shareholders. Six stadiums have this structure, in addition to 
Wembley (National) Stadium being held by the Football Association PLC. These six stadiums 
are in the lower range of capacity and their associated clubs are more prone to relegation from 
the Premier League or bottom 10 results (out of 20 clubs). Also closely related to this category is 
Wigan’s DW Stadium, where the only substantial difference is that the land the stadium is built 
upon is leased.  
Finally, the fourth category is where the stadium is held by the same PLC as the club, but 
the unified company is a subsidiary of another holding firm. With 10 stadiums, this is the most 
common form of stadium ownership in the data set. Two of the clubs in this category, 
Manchester United and Arsenal, have publicly traded share capital, although both also have clear 
controlling parties. This is also the most popular form of stadium holding for “top six” clubs 
(three of six), although the structure is seen throughout the data set. 
The remaining stadiums are a hodgepodge of holding structures arising from a range of 
stadium construction purposes. Perhaps most interesting however is the unique structure of 
Chelsea Stadium Limited (the owner of Stamford Bridge) and the naming rights of Chelsea 
Football Club, which are both subsidiaries of Chelsea Pitch Owners, a non-profit PLC created in 
the early 1990s with the intent of preventing property redevelopment of the land upon which 
Stamford Bridge resides. Chelsea Football Club, now owned by billionaire Roman Abramovich, 
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has a 199-year lease for nominal rent. Under Abramovich, Chelsea has transformed from a 
Premier League also-ran into a champion and one of the world’s wealthiest clubs. Although the 
club made an offer to Chelsea Pitch Owners to purchase the stadium and land, the fan 
shareholders declined this proposal. 
Etihad Stadium, owned by the Manchester City Council, was constructed primarily for 
the Commonwealth Games and to be repurposed thereafter as a replacement for Manchester 
City’s Maine Road.34 When the project and lease were contemplated, Manchester City was a 
lower half of the Premier League club that would not have had the financial means for a new 
facility. Like Chelsea, new ownership has since made the club into a champion and one of the 
world’s elite,35 and new television contracts have transformed the finances of the Premier League 
more generally.  
London Stadium was a similar legacy and conversion project from the 2012 Olympics. 
The stadium is ultimately owned by the City of London through a development corporation 
tasked with redeveloping the Olympic Park, and is leased to West Ham United.36 As with Etihad 
Stadium, the facility likely would not have been constructed in the location, configuration, and 
timeframe it was but-for the Olympic Games.  
In Newcastle, St James’ Park has been owned by City Council for decades. With the 
council-owned KCOM in Hull and Liberty in Swansea, these stadiums were substantially 
publicly financed, largely because councils desired a new stadium as a public good and the clubs 
at the time of construction had insufficient financial means.37 A similar situation existed in 
Huddersfield, although Kirklees Stadium is a joint venture held 40 percent by each of the local 
council, the football club, with the remaining 20 percent owned by a rugby club.38 Generally 
however, with the influx of revenue and wealthier owners into the Premier League and 
Championship within the past decade, extracting public welfare might become even rarer than it 
has been relative to what is seen in North America.  
 
IV. STADIUM OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, 
AND AUSTRALIA 
 
Stadium governance in English soccer is perhaps best contextualized through comparison 
to the three large and wealthy English-speaking countries in the world outside of the United 
Kingdom: the US, Canada, and Australia. As we will see in this section, despite similar corporate 
 
34 Steve Wilson, How Manchester City Won the Stadium Lottery, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 13, 2011), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/teams/manchester-city/8257210/How-Manchester-City-won-the-stadium-
lottery.html. 
35 Id.  
36 Owen Gibson, How West Ham Struck the Deal of the Century with Olympic Stadium Move, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
14, 2006), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/apr/14/west-ham-deal-century-olympic-stadium.  
37 See KCOM Stadium, About the KCOM Stadium, http://kcomstadium.com/about-the-kcom-stadium; Rachel Jones, 
New Deal for Swansea's Liberty Stadium, (Nov. 17, 2017), https://businessnewswales.com/new-deal-swanseas-
liberty-stadium/. 
38 David Conn, Huddersfield's Community Stadium Dream Sours in Ownership Wrangle, THE GUARDIAN (May 5, 
2009), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2009/may/06/huddersfield-town  
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laws and histories,39 and a documented convergence trend within the broader realm of corporate 
governance, this convergence trend has not extended to stadium governance.  
For each stadium I collected the same variables as with the England data set: the ultimate 
owner, the stadium’s corporate structure, and the original purpose for which the stadium was 
constructed or substantially renovated, whether there is ancillary development or club controlled 
ancillary development. Without the benefit of equivalent sources to Companies House, I used a 
combination of websites from teams, stadiums, stadium authorities, as well as sub-federal 
governments. I also accessed summaries from the National Sports Law Institute. Where public 
financial statements were available, these were likewise employed. 
A. United States 
In the US, the National Football League is the best comparator to the English Premier 
League as opposed to Major League Soccer – similar to the Premier League, the NFL is the 
dominant professional sports league and the two leagues are the world’s largest in revenue terms. 
One issue with using the NFL as a comparator is that the NFL has far more competitive and 
financial parity than the Premier League due in large part to the NFL salary cap and draft. Indeed 
at the bottom range of this data set, there are perhaps more commonalities with MLS – the level 
of play in MLS is sometimes compared to that of the English Championship and the soccer 
specific stadiums in MLS are similar in size to those seen in the Championship or with less 
wealthy Premier League clubs (capacities in the 18,000-25,000 range).  
Thus, I have built data sets of the 2018 permanent NFL stadiums as well as soccer 
specific MLS stadiums for US teams (there are three MLS stadiums included in the Canadian 
discussion). The temporary NFL stadiums in Los Angeles and the planned stadium in Las Vegas 
are excluded from the NFL set, while non-soccer specific stadiums are excluded from the MLS 
set (although several MLS teams play in NFL stadiums).  
1. National Football League 
The NFL has a traditional North American franchise structure, although the league 
formally considers itself a trade association with 32 member teams held by private owners. 24 of 
29 permanent NFL stadiums in 2018 are publicly owned. Of these 24 publicly owned stadiums, 
four are directly held by a municipal government, four are owned by counties, one is jointly held 
by a city and county (the Oakland Coliseum), 14 are owned by public authorities, and one 
(Soldier Field) by a conventional agency (the Chicago Park District). 
Starting with the most common structure, a public authority is a (typically state) 
government created agency for the purpose of participating in the economy. Extremely common 
in the US, public authorities differ from conventional agencies in that they are not directly 
accountable to elected officials and can operate outside of many state government norms.40 
These authorities have corporate powers and are governed by boards appointed for varying terms 
by elected officials. Many authorities are purpose-built stadium authorities, while others are 
 
39 Andrew Lilico, In the Trump Era, the Plan for a Canadian-U.K.-Australia-New Zealand Trade Alliance is 
Quickly Catching on, FINANCIAL POST (Feb. 13, 2017), http://business.financialpost.com/opinion/in-the-trump-era-
the-plan-for-a-canadian-u-k-australia-new-zealand-trade-alliance-is-quickly-catching-on.  
40 See Jerome J. Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 553 (1957). 
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merged with tourism or convention authorities. In some cases, stadium or tourism authorities 
also govern a Major League Baseball (MLB) stadium.  
Table 2. NFL stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity City Owner Structure† Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Arrowhead 
Stadium 
76,000 Kansas City Jackson County 
Sports Complex 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
AT&T 
Stadium 
80,000 Arlington City of Arlington City No No 
Bank of 
America 
Stadium 
75,000 Charlotte Panthers Stadium 
LLC 
LLCS No No 
Century Link 
Field 
68,000 Seattle Washington State 
Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority Yes Yes 
FedEx Field 82,000 Landover Dan Snyder  LLCD No No 
FirstEnergy 
Stadium 
67,000 Cleveland City of Cleveland City No No 
Ford Field 65,000 Detroit Detroit Wayne 
County Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority Yes Yes 
Gillette 
Stadium 
66,000 Foxborough Kraft Group LLCD Yes Yes 
Hard Rock 
Stadium 
65,000 Miami 
Gardens 
South Florida 
Stadium LLC 
LLCS No No 
Heinz Field 68,000 Pittsburgh Sport and 
Exhibition 
Authority of 
Pittsburgh and 
Allegheny 
County 
Public authority No No 
Lambeau Field 81,000 Green Bay City of Green 
Bay/Brown 
County 
City, County Yes Yes 
Levi's Stadium 68,000 Santa Clara Santa Clara 
Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority Yes Yes 
Lincoln 
Financial Field 
69,000 Philadelphia City of 
Philadelphia 
City No No 
Lucas Oil 
Stadium 
67,000 Indianapolis Indiana Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
M&T Bank 
Stadium 
71,000 Baltimore Maryland 
Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
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Table 2. NFL stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity City Owner Structure† Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Mercedes-
Benz 
Superdome 
73,000 New Orleans Louisiana 
Stadium and 
Exposition 
District 
Public authority No No 
Mercedes-
Benz Stadium 
71,000 Atlanta Georgia World 
Congress Center 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
Met Life 
Stadium 
82,000 East 
Rutherford 
MetLife Stadium 
Company 
LLCS No No 
New Era Field 71,000 Orchard Park Erie County County No No 
Nissan 
Stadium 
69,000 Nashville Nashville County County No No 
NRG Stadium  72,000 Houston Harris County - 
Houston Sports 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
Oakland 
Coliseum 
53,000 Oakland Oakland-
Alameda County 
Stadium 
Authority 
Public authority No No 
Paul Brown 
Stadium 
65,000 Cincinnati Hamilton County County Yes No 
Raymond 
James Stadium 
65,000 Tampa Hillsborough 
County 
County No No 
Soldier Field 61,000 Chicago Chicago Park 
District 
Public agency No No 
Sports 
Authority Field 
76,000 Denver Metropolitan 
Football Stadium 
District  
Public authority No No 
TIAA Bank 
Field 
67,000 Jacksonville City of 
Jacksonville 
City No No 
University of 
Phoenix 
Stadium 
63,000 Glendale Arizona Sports 
and Tourism 
Authority 
Public authority Yes No 
US Bank 
Stadium 
66,000 Minneapolis Minnesota Sports 
Facilities 
Authority 
Public authority Yes No 
†: LLCS: Limited Liability Corporation, Subsidiary; LLCD: Limited Liability 
Corporation, Directly Owned 
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2. Major League Soccer 
MLS is the first division of soccer in the US and Canada. A legacy product of the 1994 
World Cup, MLS is largely reliant on gate attendance for revenues.41 As of the 2018 season, 
there will be 15 MLS soccer specific stadiums in the US. Of these 15, eight are publicly owned. 
Unlike the NFL where public authorities are the most common, only Houston’s MLS stadium is 
held by a public authority, which also owns three other major league stadiums in the city. 
Another, Philadelphia’s stadium in suburban Chester, is held by the county. In Chester’s case, 
the city has been in various forms of receivership42 and was likely not deemed by the state or 
county to be an appropriate holding vehicle. Besides these two instances, the remainder of 
publicly owned MLS stadiums are held by municipalities. 
For the seven stadiums that are privately held, the unique single-entity structure of MLS 
adds structural wrinkle. Under US antitrust law, a deemed “single-entity” cannot conspire with 
itself to restrain trade and is thus incapable of violating antitrust law.43 For a professional sports 
league, this status would provide a distinct advantage in collective bargaining.44 As a relatively 
recent invention conceptualized with this strategic objective in mind, this means that all MLS 
clubs are formally owned by the league (the single-entity), and the local operating groups 
actually own a share in the league instead of a franchise.45 However private stadiums are 
typically held by separate companies owned by the holders of local MLS operating rights – thus 
the ultimate controlling parties are generally one and the same despite the contortion of the MLS 
governance structure. 
Table 3. MLS stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity City Owner Owner 
structure† 
Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Audi Field 20,000 District of 
Columbia 
District of 
Columbia 
City Yes Yes 
Avaya Stadium 18,000 San Jose San Jose 
Earthquakes 
LLCD Yes Yes 
Banc of 
California 
Stadium 
22,000 Los Angeles LAFC Sports LLCD No No 
BBVA Compass 
Stadium 
22,000 Houston Harris County-
Houston Sports 
Authority 
County/Public 
authority 
Yes No 
 
41 John C. Bradbury, Determinants of Attendance in Major League Soccer, 34 J. SPORT MGMT. (2020) at 53. 
42 Municipalities Financial Recovery Plan for the City of Chester, ECONSULT SOLUTIONS, (Jul. 15, 2016), 
http://www.chestercity.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/FILED_Financial_Recovery_Plan_Chester_07152016.pdf.  
43 Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity Theory: A Defense of the Status 
Quo, 67 IND. L.J. 25 (1991) at 27-28. 
44 Gary R. Roberts, Reconciling Federal Labor and Antitrust Policy: The Special Case of Sports League Labor 
Market Restraints, 75 GEO. L. J. 19 (1986). 
45 Terry Brennan, How MLS’ Single Entity Status Works and its Relationship With Antitrust Law, LAW IN SPORT, 
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/articles/item/how-mls-single-entity-status-works-and-its-
relationship-with-antitrust-law. 
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Table 3. MLS stadium ownership structures 
Stadium Capacity City Owner Owner 
structure† 
Ancillary 
Dev. 
Club 
Control 
Children's 
Mercy Park 
18,000 Kansas City, 
Ks 
Kansas Unified 
Development 
LLC 
LLCS No No 
Dick's Sporting 
Goods Park 
18,000 Commerce 
City, Co 
City of 
Commerce City 
City Yes Yes 
Mapfre Stadium 19,000 Columbus Precourt Sports 
Ventures LLC 
City No No 
Orlando City 
Stadium 
25,000 Orlando Orlando Sports 
Holdings 
LLCS No No 
Providence Park 21,000 Portland City of Portland City Yes No 
Red Bull Arena 25,000 Harrison, NJ Hudson County 
Improvement 
Authority 
Public authority Yes No 
Rio Tinto 
Stadium 
20,000 Sandy, Ut Utah Soccer 
LLC 
LLCD No No 
StubHub Center 27,000 Carson, Ca AEG LLCS No No 
Talen Energy 
Stadium 
18,000 Chester, Pa Delaware 
County 
County Yes Yes 
Toyota Park 20,000 Bridgeview, 
Il 
Village of 
Bridgeview 
City No No 
Toyota Stadium 20,000 Frisco, Tx City of Frisco City Yes No 
†: LLCS: Limited Liability Corporation, Subsidiary; LLCD: Limited Liability 
Corporation, Directly Owned 
 
B. Canada 
In Canada, most large outdoor stadiums are for the Canadian Football League.46 The CFL 
is a nine team franchise structured league similar to the NFL with six current teams owned by 
private parties and three by non-profit community organizations.47 As with MLS, there have 
been instances of one owner controlling multiple teams, and a history of financial and fan base 
difficulties.48 Most CFL salary expenses are now covered by its national television contract, but 
 
46 See Table 4. 
47 Dan Ralph, CFL Asking Federal Government for up to $150 Million in Financial Assistance, WINNIPEG FREE 
PRESS (April. 28, 2016), https://www.winnipegfreepress.com/sports/football/cfl/cp-newsalert-cfl-asking-
government-for-up-to-150-million-in-financial-aid-570025142.html.  
48 Cam Cole, TV Deal Keeps CFL Afloat as League Suffers From Diminished Ratings, Alarming Attendance Figures 
in Some Markets, NATIONAL POST (Nov. 20, 2015), http://nationalpost.com/sports/football/cfl/tv-deal-keeps-cfl-
afloat-as-league-suffers-from-diminished-ratings-alarming-attendance-figures-in-some-markets. 
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profitability is substantially determined by gate receipts.49 The league’s popularity is traditionally 
strongest in its prairie markets (Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg).50  
CFL stadiums generally range in capacity from 20,000 to 60,000, and the average CFL 
game attendance is around 25,000.51 There are also two stadiums shared between CFL and MLS 
teams, and one soccer specific MLS stadium. Also included in this 12 facility data set is Rogers 
Centre, which has become a Major League Baseball only venue, but was the long-time home of 
the Toronto Argonauts CFL team, and Montreal Olympic Stadium, now used for certain playoff 
CFL or MLS games, but previously home to the MLB Expos and CFL Alouettes. 
Of the 12 stadiums, only two are privately held. Stade Saputo, a soccer specific stadium 
in Montreal, was initially privately financed (although the MLS renovation was funded by the 
Quebec government) and is owned by the Saputo family, operators of the MLS club.52 Rogers 
Centre in Toronto was originally the provincially owned SkyDome, but was sold to Rogers 
Communications, the publicly traded communications behemoth and owners of the Blue Jays, in 
2005.53 A third stadium, Investors Group Field in Winnipeg, is a joint venture corporation held 
by four parties: the province, the city, the team, and the University of Manitoba (on whose 
campus the facility is located).54  
The involvement of public universities as owners of stadiums where professional sports 
are the primary revenue activity is also seen in Calgary and Montreal (Molson Stadium at McGill 
University). While many American public universities own professional-sized American football 
stadiums, these are not shared with NFL teams except on a temporary basis (such as in 
Minneapolis and Los Angeles). In Canada however, with major public universities often located 
in major cities, the university/professional football stadium is a sensible dual-purpose structure.  
The most common stadium holding structure in Canada is municipal ownership, with five 
facilities under this heading. The remaining two stadiums, BC Place and Montreal Olympic 
Stadium, are owned through provincial crown corporations.55 A provincial crown corporation in 
Canada is akin to a state public authority in the US – while reporting to a political ministry, 
crown corporations are somewhat insulated from political interference and can participate in the 
broader economy.56  
 
 
 
49 Id.  
50 Rob Williams, Outspoken BC Lions Player Makes Fun of CFL Attendance, OFFSIDE VANCOUVER (Sep. 18, 2019), 
https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/bc-lions-duron-carter-cfl-attendance.  
51 See Table 4. 
52 Stade Saputo, Impact Montreal, https://www.impactmontreal.com/en/stadium/stade-saputo.  
53 Emma McIntosh, 12 Years Ago, the Rogers Centre Was Just the SkyDome, TORONTO STAR (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2017/02/02/12-years-ago-the-rogers-centre-was-just-the-skydome.html.  
54 Bartley Kives, Final Cost of Investors Group Field Expected to be $384M, CBC NEWS (Jun. 20, 2016), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/investors-stadium-cost-1.3639529.  
55 See PavCo, http://www.bcpavco.com/resources/reports/; Régie des installations olympiques, Quebec, 
http://www4.gouv.qc.ca/fr/Portail/citoyens/programme-service/Pages/Info.aspx?sqctype=mo&sqcid=220.  
56 Kazi Stastna, What Are Crown Corporations and Why Do They Exist?, CBC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/what-are-crown-corporations-and-why-do-they-exist-1.1135699.  
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Table 4. Stadium ownership structures in Canada 
Stadium Capacity City Owner Structure Purpose of stadium 
BC Place 54,000 Vancouver PavCo Public 
Authority 
Attract 
MLB/Olympics/CFL/MLS 
BMO Field 30,000 Toronto City of Toronto City MLS 
Commonwealth 
Stadium  
56,000 Edmonton City of Edmonton City Commonwealth Games 
Investors Group 
Field 
33,000 Winnipeg Triple B Stadium 
Inc. 
Non-profit 
corp. 
CFL 
McMahon Stadium 46,000 Calgary University of 
Calgary 
University University/CFL 
Molson Stadium 25,000 Montreal McGill University University University/CFL 
Mosaic Stadium 33,000 Regina City of Regina City CFL 
Olympic Stadium 66,000 Montreal Régie des 
installations 
olympiques 
Public 
Authority 
Olympics/MLB/CFL 
Rogers Centre 53,000 Toronto Rogers 
Communications 
Private corp.; 
public traded 
MLB 
Stade Saputo 20,000 Montreal Saputo Inc. Private corp. MLS 
TD Place 24,000 Ottawa City of Ottawa City CFL 
Tim Hortons Field 24,000 Hamilton City of Hamilton City CFL/Pan Am Games 
 
C. Australia 
The Australian data set covers 24 stadiums used in the Australian Football League and 
the A-League, the first division of Australian soccer. Australian stadiums are generally at least 
dual purpose, with the most common sharing occurring in rectangular stadiums between soccer 
and rugby clubs, and oval stadiums between AFL and cricket teams.57 This said, there are other 
varieties of crossover league and sport sharing. However, including two of four leagues provides 
a representative sample, and makes for a better comparison with Canada (with the AFL being a 
natural comparator for the CFL), and the soccer specific stadiums of MLS. It is also common for 
the largest cities – Sydney and Melbourne – to have multiple teams in the same league, often in 
different stadiums. 
Of the nine A-League stadiums included, only one is privately held. Three of the eight 
public stadiums are directly owned by the state government, while another three are owned 
through state government authorities, one by a public trust, and one by a city council. The AFL 
 
57 See Table 5. 
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stadium story is much the same. Here state governments directly own eight stadiums, one is 
owned by a state government authority, one is held by a trust, and four by city councils.58  
State governments are the dominant players in Australian stadiums. Roughly half of 
state-controlled stadiums are owned directly, but New South Wales and Western Australia have 
placed ownership in purpose-built stadium crown corporations, akin to those seen in some 
Canadian provinces. However, with the exception of Sydney stadiums related to the 2000 
Olympics, most new or major renovation stadium projects were primarily intended to play host 
to at least two professional sports. Interestingly, the only non-government owned stadiums are 
owned by either the national or regional sections of the AFL.  
Like MLS, Australian leagues also have unique structures at the league and club level 
worth noting. The AFL, the stronger and higher revenue of the two Australian leagues discussed, 
is directly governed by an independent commission with commission members selected by 
clubs.59 The commission grants licenses to clubs for the right to operate within the league. Most 
clubs are held as non-profit corporations, controlled by a broad member shareholder base and 
governed by a board of directors,60 while other clubs are held by regional bodies of Australian 
Rules Football. Attendance in the AFL is strong (over 30,000 per game)61 and most clubs are 
profitable. Profits, however, are reinvested by clubs into growing the game locally.  
The ten team A-League, launched in 2004, is owned by the Australian Football 
Federation (AFF). As with the AFL Commission, the AFF licenses operating rights to clubs.62 
With the A-League however, clubs are privately owned, and profits are retained privately. A-
League attendance lags that of the AFL and is the weakest of the leagues covered in this paper, 
with average game attendances of 11,000-15,000. This said, A-League attendance is not too far 
off MLS (19,000 in 2014) or the English Championship (20,000 in 2016/17).  
 
Table 5. AFL and A-League stadium ownership structures in Australia 
A-League 
stadiums 
Capacity City Owner Structure Purpose of stadium 
AAMI Park 30,000 Melbourne Victoria State Gov. Soccer/rugby 
Allianz Stadium 45,000 Sydney Sydney Cricket 
Ground Trust 
Trust Soccer/rugby 
ANZ Stadium 83,000 Sydney Venues NSW State Gov. Auth. Olympics 
Central Coast 
Stadium 
20,000 Gosford Central Coast 
Council 
City Soccer/rugby 
 
58 Id.  
59 Corporate Governance, Concise Financial Report, 
http://s.afl.com.au/staticfile/AFL%20Tenant/AFL/Files/AFL%20Corporate%20Governance.pdf.  
60 JULIE FOREMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE AUSTRALIAN FOOTBALL LEAGUE: A CRITICAL EVALUATION 
(2006) at 8. 
61 Attendances (1921-2017), AFL TABLES, https://afltables.com/afl/crowds/summary.html.  
62 Dominic Bossi, How A-League Expansion Will Work and Why Promotion and Relegation Can be Forgotten, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 21 2016), https://www.smh.com.au/sport/soccer/how-aleague-expansion-will-
work-and-why-promotion-and-relegation-can-be-forgotten-20161021-gs7g0r.html.  
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Table 5. AFL and A-League stadium ownership structures in Australia 
A-League 
stadiums 
Capacity City Owner Structure Purpose of stadium 
Etihad Stadium 56,000 Melbourne AFL Non-profit corp. AFL/soccer 
Hindmarsh 
Stadium 
16,000 Adelaide South Australia State Gov. Soccer/rugby 
McDonald 
Jones Stadium 
33,000 Newcastle Venues NSW State Gov. Auth. Soccer/rugby 
nib Stadium 20,000 Perth Venues West  State Gov. Auth. Soccer/rugby 
Suncorp 
Stadium 
52,000 Brisbane Queensland  State Gov. Soccer/rugby 
AFL 
stadiums 
Capacity City Owner Structure Purpose of stadium 
Adelaide Oval 53,000 Adelaide South Australia State Gov. Cricket 
Bellerive Oval 20,000 Hobart Clarence City 
Council 
City Cricket/AFL 
Carrara 
Stadium 
25,000 Gold Coast Queensland State Gov. AFL 
Cazaly's 
Stadium 
12,000 Cairns AFL Cairns Non-profit corp. AFL 
Eureka Stadium 11,000 Wendouree City of Ballarat City Cricket/AFL 
Kardinia Park 34,000 Geelong Kardinia Park 
Stadium Trust 
Trust AFL/soccer 
Manuka Oval 15,000 Canberra Australian 
Capital 
Territory Gov. 
State Gov. Cricket/AFL/rugby 
Marrara Oval 12,000 Darwin Northern 
Territory 
State Gov. AFL 
Melbourne 
Cricket Ground 
100,000 Melbourne Victoria State Gov. Cricket 
Perth Stadium 60,000 Perth Western 
Australia 
State Gov. Four sports 
Sydney Cricket 
Ground 
48,000 Sydney Venues NSW State Gov. Auth. Cricket 
Sydney 
Showground 
Stadium 
25,000 Sydney NSW State Gov. Olympics/AFL 
The Gabba 42,000 Brisbane Queensland State Gov. Cricket 
Traeger Park 10,000 Alice Springs Alice Springs 
Town Council 
City AFL/cricket 
York Park 20,000 Launceston Launceston City 
Council 
City AFL/cricket 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. Corporate, antitrust, tax, European law, and risk management considerations 
The countries discussed generally best represent the Anglo-American stream in legal and 
corporate thought. If firm and asset holding structures in these countries can be seen as broadly 
reminiscent, or at least among the most similar in the developed world, then the natural 
hypothesis is that stadium holding structures should also converge based on similar streams of 
corporate and regulatory thought. Instead, differences often dictate.   
Starting with England, the key takeaway is that the overwhelming majority of recent 
Premier League stadiums – 26 of 34 – share common corporate ownership with the club playing 
in them.63 In all of these instances, the reason for building or substantially renovating the stadium 
was to host the club. The English level of club stadium ownership is unprecedented in this study. 
The primary difference in England relative to the US is that there is no restriction on the 
supply of clubs and club fan bases are strongly tied to a city, or even an area of a city. This 
means that prospective owners have many options on which clubs to purchase and once 
purchased, they can invest in as much talent as they wish to gain promotion (subject to Financial 
Fair Play regulation). Instead of stadium related revenues, the business play for new owners is 
the lucrative television rights shared between Premier League clubs. Thus, not only is there less 
of a scope for relocation, the traditional benefit of relocation – a new publicly funded stadium – 
is far less important.  
Further, restrictions on state aid under European Union law would make stadium 
subsidies prima facie illegal provision of state resources distorting or threatening to distort 
competition.64 Although there are potential exemptions for one-time financial distress, common 
European interest, cultural development, or economic development in distressed regions, as 
construed through stadium related decisions by the European Commission, these are unlikely to 
apply to current Premier League teams. Common interest or cultural development – which the 
body of European Commission decisions has allowed in instances of national stadiums where the 
facility will develop the game – would be hard to see as being applied to top division stadiums 
given both the localized impact of the team and the highly developed nature of the English game, 
except in circumstances where the stadium results from a mega-event such as the Olympics.  
Economic development is a more viable route in certain circumstances where the location 
is distressed, but this has not yet been tested in the post-Lisbon Treaty English context. However, 
instances of publicly funded and owned stadiums in distressed places such as Hull, indicate that a 
limited class of potential facilities can successfully find exemption from state aid restrictions. 
Likewise, the necessity of one-time aid to a failing club is hard to foresee in light of the Premier 
League’s record television revenues. Still with impending Brexit, European derived limits on 
state aid may disappear altogether. 
Where the stadium and club are not ultimately owned by the same parties, there is 
divergence in how the stadium is owned and for what purpose it was built. Facilities such as 
Etihad and London Stadium are mega-event legacies where clubs were able to attain favorable 
 
63 See Table 1. 
64 European Commission, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Part Three – Title VII Chapter 1 
Section 2 Article 107. (ntd. Bluebook was unclear on proper citation for EU Treaty) 
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lease terms in order for the public to salvage some significant use. Yet despite being the ultimate 
respective owners of similarly sized athletics turned soccer stadiums, Manchester and London 
have selected different governance paths. Likewise, Hull, Swansea, and Hudderfield are smaller 
centers with smaller clubs with city councils that have chosen to substantially cover stadium 
investments. The commonality is that substantial public capital contributions have been made 
where the public sector has wanted the stadium more than the private sector’s desire or capacity 
to pay at the time.  
With the monopoly driven incentives for subsidization not present, one might 
hypothesize that structures would be driven by the next strongest business considerations, 
namely tax minimization. Yet if a local authority does not have to bid with subsidies to retain a 
team, then the proliferation of tax break (as opposed to direct grant) subsidies is also weakened. 
For instance, whereas a team would find value in having a public body exempt from property 
taxes hold a stadium, a local government in England would seem to have far less pressure to lose 
part of its tax base than its American counterpart.  
Even if a club could persuade a local authority that a new facility could create economic 
gains in excess of waived property taxes and this break did not offend EU state aid law, this has a 
different cost in the UK system of land value taxation. Whereas in the US and Canada, most 
publicly held real property is tax exempt, in the UK’s ratable value system takes into account 
more than the value of land and improvements typically assessed and taxed in North America 
and exemptions are limited to categories defined at the national level.65 Instead, the business 
ratable value is intended to estimate the market value of the premises’ annual rent.66 Applied to 
stadiums, this translates to the estimated cost of replacing the stadium as well as the club’s 
income and ability to pay. In recent years the setting of business rates for a five year period has 
also been a source of contention from clubs in the relegation zone.67 With club revenues highly 
reliant on television rights from the Premier League, if a team is relegated after their rates are set 
based upon Premier League income, the tax bill can become a significant burden. As clubs have 
proven adept at carrying forward losses to avoid large corporate tax bills, ratable value often 
serves as their largest source of tax payment, with larger clubs with facilities on more valuable 
land paying in the range of £2 million to £4 million per year.68 
For ownership structures, a primary consequence of business rates is that they are not on 
their face avoidable through leasing a facility – someone will have to pay. Still, West Ham has 
leveraged bargaining power to ensure that the E20, the public corporation tasked with the legacy 
management of London Stadium, pays roughly 80 percent of the ratable value.69 Here is the 
primary instance of a Premier League club acting in much the same way as a North American 
club extracting subsidy from a public body – instead of the leverage being the potential departure 
of the club from a city, the bargaining power was derived from the prospect of the stadium being 
a white elephant if a Premier League tenant was not found. 
 
65 See Local Government Business Rates, UK GOVERNMENT VALUATION OFFICE AGENCY, 
https://www.gov.uk/topic/local-government/business-rates (Last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
66 Id. 
67 Business Rates System Scores Own Goal Yet Again, COLLIERS (May 9, 2018), https://www.colliers.com/en-
gb/uk/insights/property-news/2018/0509-business-rates-system-scores-own-goal-yet-again. 
68 Id. 
69 Exclusive: Spurs Top The Tax Table, ALTUS GROUP (June 2019), 
https://property.altusgroup.com/2019/06/exclusive-spurs-top-the-tax-table/. 
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In the United States however, publicly owned stadiums are the norm. This is reflective of 
economic incentives arising from divergent regulatory decisions. Namely, American legislators 
and courts have chosen to protect collective bargaining through making labor law the primary 
arena of labor dispute resolution instead of antitrust law.70 In turn, this has protected leagues 
from antitrust scrutiny of what may otherwise be anticompetitive and cartel-like behavior.71 With 
the monopoly power of leagues intact, the artificial suppression of team supply pits cities and 
regions in competition with one another to attract and retain teams.72 This competition is perhaps 
most visibly operationalized through public stadium subsidies. Where stadiums are heavily 
publicly subsidized as a percentage of capital cost,73 there is a high likelihood of public 
ownership.74 Where there is a high gross public subsidy cost,75 a public authority is the 
overwhelmingly used holding vehicle.76 
The two primary advantages to stadium-related public authorities are interrelated: first, to 
access federally tax-exempt bonds for construction, and second, to limit financial risk to general 
state or local revenues. In the US, state and local government bonds are generally exempt from 
federal taxation.77 Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a stadium bond is classified as private and 
non-exempt if it meets two conditions: a nongovernmental entity uses over 10 percent of bond 
funds, and directly or indirectly used business property secures over 10 percent of debt service.78 
Effectively, not meeting the second condition is the only way where a stadium bond can remain 
exempt.79 To surmount this hurdle, a state or local government will have to finance 90 percent of 
the facility and these repayment sources cannot be linked to privately created revenue.80 This 
means that venue gross cost is minimized if it is overwhelmingly funded by the state or local 
government.81  
If a facility is to be publicly owned, a public authority is secondly an effective means to 
shield state or local treasuries from default and other risks. In some cases, the inverse may apply 
where holding the stadium within a public authority protects the stadium asset from a poorly 
managed state or local government. However other jurisdictions are more willing to bear the risk 
to general revenues and debt ratings as bonds backed by general revenues can often obtain a 
lower interest rate.82 This willingness to accept risk can explain some instances where a stadium 
is directly held by a local government. Finally, public authorities can be neutral holding vehicles 
where multiple levels of government (municipal, county, state) make significant financial 
contributions.  
 
70 Roberts, supra note 44.  
71 Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1989). 
72 Id.  
73 Long, supra note 1.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Ted Gayer et al., Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds and the Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTE, Sep. 2016.  
77 Id at 6. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Thomas Kenny, General Obligation Bonds and Revenue Bonds, THE BALANCE (Aug. 1, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-general-obligation-bonds-and-revenue-bonds-417150. 
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Additionally, public authorities are a way to avoid sales or value-added taxes on personal 
seat licenses and sponsorships,83 the former being a common means of team contributions for 
capital costs. Likewise, public authorities are exempt from property taxes, meaning that a tenant 
may save tens of millions a year relative to holding the stadium privately. This is again 
contrasted with England, where stadiums are locally taxed on the tenant’s business ratable value 
that is distinguishable from a land value tax. 
Finally, a public authority can sometimes be a way to circumvent state law requiring 
referenda for major capital project funding, or open meetings and records laws. With the former, 
this can see public funding procured despite substantial public opposition that would make a 
referenda difficult to pass, or overcome the failure of a ballot measure. With the latter, the 
mechanics and operations of ongoing subsidies can be obscured from public view and 
accountability.  
As for teams, unless they have overwhelmingly self-funded the stadium, franchise 
owners are typically content to be tenants.84 This allows teams to separate a highly lucrative 
league business from being responsible for maintenance and ongoing capital expenses for lightly 
used buildings. Unlike many arenas that are used for over 200 events per year, the size and 
exposure to elements of NFL stadiums limits the number of concerts and other events. 
Within the same country however, MLS stadiums demonstrate somewhat different 
dynamics. Relative to the NFL, there are two primary differences in MLS stadium holding 
structures. First, a far greater percentage of soccer specific stadiums are privately held.85 Second, 
the publicly held soccer specific stadiums are overwhelmingly owned by municipalities, whereas 
public NFL stadiums are mostly held by public authorities.86 The explanations of these 
differences are interrelated. With the former, NFL stadiums are far more costly endeavors 
(generally anywhere from five to ten times more expensive),87 meaning that any single 
municipality is less likely to be able to afford the capital costs without assistance from senior 
jurisdictions. NFL teams are also far more culturally valuable to cities than clubs in the relatively 
nascent MLS – the pressure on politicians to extend subsidies to retain or attract a NFL team are 
seemingly greater, supported by the significantly higher public gross and capital contributions.88 
Still as MLS has grown in popularity, the league has been increasingly effective in extracting 
soccer specific stadiums as the price of hosting a club.89 
However, the significantly higher gross cost of NFL stadiums increases the attractiveness 
of both federally tax-exempt bonds and the lower borrowing costs that senior jurisdictions can 
often access. These senior jurisdictions can also offer more significant revenue streams not 
connected to the business of the facility in order to keep bonds tax exempt in the first place. On 
the other hand, less expensive MLS stadiums can be more easily funded by single municipalities 
 
83 Patrick Rishe, 6 Reasons Pro Sports Teams Invest In Ancillary Real Estate Development Projects, FORBES (Oct. 8 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2018/10/08/6-reasons-why-pro-sports-teams-invest-in-ancillary-real-
estate-development-projects/#c22120333aaa. 
84 Long, supra note 1 at 100. 
85 See Table 3.  
86 See Tables 2 and 3. 
87 Long, supra note 1. 
88 Id.  
89 Kriston Capps, Here Comes the Soccer Arena Boondoogle, CITYLAB (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.citylab.com/design/2017/12/are-soccer-arenas-the-new-football-stadiums/547598/.  
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or ownership groups. This leads into the latter structural difference concerning how public 
stadiums are held. The reduced need for tax exempt bonds removes much of the impetus for 
multi-jurisdiction involvement and sheltering risk separate from general revenues, changing the 
public authority cost-benefit equation (i.e., an authority might make more sense for an $800 
million stadium, but not an $80 million stadium). 
Moving to Canada, there is a similarly high incidence of public stadium ownership.90 
However, there are somewhat different incentives for stadium governance structures in Canada 
than in the US. First, there are no incentives created by tax exempt bonds. Instead, the teams and 
leagues involved for the most part have limited financial means, while the public parties are 
willing to finance the facility, perhaps seeing the stadium as having some value as a public or 
social good, or as a political tool.91 With these facilities, the similar system of land value taxation 
in Canada to the US means that public or public university ownership of a stadium allows for a 
property tax exemption. 
Canada also shares some special antitrust protection for professional sports with the US. 
Indeed, Canada goes further than the US in that federal statute makes special provision for 
professional sports leagues that has the effect of providing preferential treatment for sports 
leagues relative to other businesses conducting prospectively anticompetitive behavior. Section 
48 of the Canadian Competition Act makes the standard of violation for “[c]onspiracy relating to 
professional sport” that of unreasonably limiting opportunities.92 This standard includes 
arrangements concerning “the granting and operation of franchises in the league.”93 Compared to 
the general prohibition against arrangements between competitors in section 45 of the Act, sports 
leagues have far more leeway to show that their conduct is not unreasonable, and are not subject 
to the presumption of anticompetitive behavior in section 45.94 
Canada, however, may share its greatest and most striking similarities with Australia. In 
both countries, the overwhelming proportion of stadiums are publicly owned,95 although 
Australia lacks university ownership. Likewise, the large stadiums in major cities are debatably 
beyond the financial means of primary tenants, and the primary tenants are second tier 
professional leagues relative to giants such as the NFL or Premier League (the CFL and MLS in 
Canada, the AFL, A-League, Rugby Union/League, and Big Bash Cricket League in Australia). 
While many AFL clubs run a healthy surplus96 – in some instances driven by gambling revenue – 
the club governance structure demanding the reinvestment of profits into development of the 
game, is not the most amenable to financing stadium construction worth hundreds of millions 
compared to the billionaire ownership found in the NFL and Premier League.  
Instead, the public sector at the state level has accepted the primary financial burden of 
stadium development and ownership, whether directly or through purpose-built authorities. In 
Canada however, universities are owners of (or partners in) stadiums in three cities, a structure 
 
90 See Table 4. 
91 Jason Van Rassel, A Look at Canadian Stadiums Built With Public Funds, CALGARY HERALD (Aug. 18, 2015), 
http://calgaryherald.com/news/local-news/a-look-at-canadian-stadiums-built-with-public-funds.  
92 Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 48. 
93 Id.  
94 Id at 45.  
95 See Tables 4 and 5. 
96 2017 AFL & Club Annual Reports, FOOTY INDUSTRY, http://www.footyindustry.com/?page_id=4121.  
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absent from Australia.97 As for the motivation behind stadium construction, the distribution is 
comparable to Canada – each country has multiple stadiums arising out of mega events (such as 
the Olympics), a proportion that are renovated legacy facilities, and a remainder that are 
specifically constructed for two sports. Also, neither country has the American incentive of tax-
exempt bonds to drive structural arrangements. However, Australia mirrors the US insofar as 
stadiums are commonly held by state level public authorities.98  
Australia also shares a similar competition law framework to Canada. However, in 
Australia there is no parallel provision in the Competition and Consumer Act99 to section 48 of 
the Canadian Competition Act. Thus, the issue of monopoly sports leagues, such as the AFL and 
A-League, has been left to the courts. As the Competition and Consumer Act is relatively recent 
(2010) legislation, there has only been one address of the Act in the sports league context by the 
Full Federal Court of Australia. In this case, a commitment agreement to keep rugby teams from 
jumping to a new rival league was viewed by the Court on appeal as an illegal collective 
boycott.100  
 
B. Ancillary Real Estate Development 
One of the more noticeable trends in stadium development has been the onset of team 
controlled or related real estate development ancillary to venues. Indeed, such projects have been 
seen in all the leagues covered in this article. Thus, it is worth evaluating the issue of whether 
there is a potential relationship between legal aspects of stadium holding structures and ancillary 
real estate opportunities. Ancillary development connected to the presence of the stadium was 
deemed present or absent through the author’s analysis of Google Maps and satellite imagery, as 
well as searching of news media, club sources, and financial records to ascertain a relationship 
with club ownership parties. 
In England, 13 stadiums have ancillary commercial or residential real estate development 
meeting the standard of the author’s review. Seven of these developments are controlled by 
parties also holding clubs. While the latter category includes well publicized team driven 
developments such as those by Arsenal and Tottenham, there are also several stadiums that have 
seen retail parks developed nearby that share parking and road infrastructure with stadiums. 
Others have seen hotels, apartments, movie theatres, or some combination of the above. In some 
lesser known projects, such as Reading, Bolton and Derby, club ownership have been leading 
partners in the real estate. With Manchester City, its owners’ £1 billion real estate partnership to 
transform swaths of former industrial land near the stadium into 6,000 homes101 is debatably a 
more significant business venture than many Premier League clubs. 
In terms of stadium ownership structure, Arsenal and Tottenham, large clubs with major 
neighborhood developments own their stadiums and clubs as separate subsidiaries of a larger 
 
97 See Tables 4 and 5. 
98 See Tables 2, 3, and 5. 
99 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
100 News Ltd v Australian Rugby League Ltd (No 2) (Superleague) (1996) 64 FCR 410.  
101 Adam Jupp, City Owner and Council to Build 6,000 New Homes in £1bn Deal, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS 
(Jun. 24, 2014), https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/business/manchester-city-etihad-stadium-adug-
7313788. 
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holding company that also has separate real estate development companies. The story is much 
the same with Manchester City, except for the stadium being leased from the city. Similarly, 
smaller clubs with ancillary interests either have several subsidiaries under a central holding 
company, or both the club and stadium in a single holding company and the real estate interests 
separately. 
To use the example of Arsenal, the holding company wholly owns twelve subsidiaries for 
club-related businesses, including distinct companies for each of the club, the stadium, and the 
real estate development of the former stadium.102 The holding company and operating subsidiary 
structure has a number of prospective advantages. First, risks are contained to separate aspects of 
the business and assets in one area (such as a stadium) are not subject to lawsuits or finance 
defaults in another. Second, are the tax benefits, which in the UK include deferred taxation on 
dividends paid to the holding company and a strong network of double taxation treaties,103 both 
aspects which may be appealing to Arsenal’s beneficial owners.  
In the US, the dominance of stadium ownership by public bodies does not translate to less 
ancillary real estate development. The NFL has eight stadiums with related ancillary 
development, five of which have a direct club role. Three of the latter five are around stadiums 
owned by public authorities, with a fourth being the city/county joint ownership of Lambeau 
Field.104 Only Gillette Stadium and the Patriot Place retail development are privately owned 
alongside the team in the Kraft Group holding company. The remaining stadiums with ancillary 
development independent from club interests are held by two public authorities and a county. In 
each instance, the stadium was intended as a spur for ancillary mixed-use development that was 
eventually delivered on, although sometimes decades after stadium completion (such as in 
Hamilton County/Cincinnati). 
In MLS there are eight stadiums with related real estate development, four of which are 
club controlled.105 With the latter four, there are two cities (if the District of Columbia is 
classified as a city), a county, and LLC directly holding the stadium and club operating rights. 
Four other stadiums do not have club involvement in ancillary development. In both categories, 
there have been mixed results – significant planned and phased developments in Colorado and 
San Jose that are mostly being delivered on, while the strongest construction may be seen in 
Frisco, Texas, without club participation. In San Jose, the ancillary opportunities were seen as 
sufficiently lucrative for the club ownership to proceed without any direct stadium subsidies. In 
Frisco, the suburb had to compete with subsidies against neighboring jurisdictions to be the 
stadium host in the first place, but also implemented a long term real estate development strategy 
around the facility that has transformed a rural area into a new mixed-use city center over 15 
years.106 Meanwhile, the lands surrounding the stadium in Commerce City, Colorado, will see a 
 
102 Annual Report and Financial Statements, ARSENAL HOLDINGS LTD. (2018), 
https://www.arsenal.com/sites/default/files/documents/Arsenal%20Holdings%20Limited%20-
%20Group%20Annual%20Report%20ye%2031-5-18%20final.pdf. 
103 Taxation and Investment in United Kingdom, DELOITTE (2015), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-unitedkingdomguide-2015.pdf. 
104 See Table 2. 
105 See Table 3. 
106 Steve Brown, Frisco Square Land Sells for New Development, DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/business/real-estate/2018/11/09/frisco-square-land-sells-new-develpments. 
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blend of public (a new town center complex) and significant phased private development107 – 
while sports and real estate magnate Stan Kroenke sought subsidies for a stadium through 
competition within a region, he also desired land for a major commercial development.  
As pertaining to stadium holding structures, the aim across US leagues seems to be to 
obtain public subsidies and leasing a publicly owned stadium on terms that contractually shift 
risks and costs away from a club, but proceeding privately if the venue can be financially viable. 
In a number of these privately owned stadium contexts, team controlled ancillary development 
has played a significant role in creating a positive value proposition for the stadium from the 
club’s perspective. For both American leagues covered, this value includes a revenue source that 
does not have to be included in league-wide revenue sharing agreements.108 The nature of 
stadium type may also influence financial viability – while a cavernous and expensive NFL 
stadium that is usable for a limited number of events may be a harder to profit from proposition, 
a MLS stadium with lessened footprint and more concert potential can not only be a better 
investment from a stadium revenue perspective, but also make the ancillary development 
opportunity more lucrative through a more consistent influx of traffic.  
Likewise, many instances where significant ancillary development has occurred have 
either been in low density suburbs (like Frisco or Commerce City) or blighted areas of core 
cities. In both cases eminent domain, already consolidated ownership, and the acquisition of tax 
default properties by land banks have allowed for assembly to precede master-planned 
development. Assembly combined with low rates of occupation allow for zoning law 
amendments to further contribute to the value proposition for a club in either the public or 
privately owned facility scenario. In Commerce City for instance, part of the appeal for Kroenke 
was likely blank slate where density and uses could be planned with the help of a cooperative 
local government. 
Canada has only seen one instance of club-related ancillary stadium development 
(Ottawa). Here the renovation of a publicly owned stadium and ancillary development was part 
of a comprehensive plan to transform what was viewed as an underutilized neighborhood, as 
well as create a facility sufficient to facilitate the return of Canadian football to Ottawa. Perhaps 
more interesting has been the aggressive strategy of in-house real estate development in 
Vancouver by the PavCo public authority to recoup BC Place renovation costs through ancillary 
development.109 The ability of a provincial corporation to potentially exempt itself both from 
local property taxes and zoning restrictions, as well as gain access to supply limited casino 
licenses, has made the development in theory far more lucrative than what the private sector 
could achieve on the same lands. 
The Australian leagues examined however seem more limited on the club-related 
ancillary development front. With the AFL (and NRL sharing the same structure), the tax-free 
non-profit club holding structures would seem to explain the lack of club-related ancillary real 
estate development. Although the non-profit structure has still resulted in considerable operating 
 
107 Master Plan Overview, VICTORY CROSSING (2015), https://www.victorycrossing.com/master-plan/master-plan-
overview/. 
108 Rishe, supra note 81. 
109 See Kenneth Chan, City Council Approves BC Place Stadium Tower Height With Rental Housing Requirement, 
DAILY HIVE (Jul. 25, 2018), https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/777-pacific-boulevard-vancouver-bc-place-tower-
pavco-approved-july-2018.  
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surpluses in large part due to gambling revenues, a mixed-use real estate development may be a 
leap too far for a tax structure that has seen its share of public criticism.110 A-League teams are 
for profit ventures and beneficially owned by individuals, but none of their stadiums are 
privately owned.  
Even if Australian clubs wished to pursue ancillary development options, the stadiums 
themselves are overwhelming owned by state governments or public authorities, and are often 
situated in legally dedicated athletics parks where transition to non-athletics use may have more 
land use hurdles than with American stadium sites. Where there has been land available for 
master planning, major ancillary development projects have instead often come from public 
authorities, such as the mixed-use village developed in Sydney’s Olympic Park, or the stadium 
anchored Docklands in Melbourne. 
C. Limitations 
Finally, I should note some limitations. While there may be associative relationships 
between club success and stadium holding structures, especially in the Premier League context, 
this issue is beyond the scope of the paper. Further research and interviews with stadium 
controlling parties may also reveal other tax motivations or historical legacies behind stadium 
holding structures. Additionally, stadium ownership is merely one avenue of investigation in the 
realm of stadium governance and there is strong potential for further useful work in many related 
areas. Some particularly interesting paths of future related research include league structures, 
club holding structures, as well as club board governance, financial disclosures, and accounting 
practices. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has evaluated ownership structures of 114 stadiums in England, the US, 
Canada, and Australia through the lens of the broader corporate governance law and policy 
convergence seen in these jurisdictions. While publicly owned stadiums are the norm in the US, 
Canada, and Australia, they are the exception in England. The root explanation for differences 
between England and the US concern league monopolies and the threat of relocation if a publicly 
financed stadium is not provided. This effect is seemingly stronger in more lucrative and 
culturally ingrained leagues such as the NFL, and weaker, but still present in developing leagues 
like MLS. Publicly financed stadiums are then owned through various public holding structures 
based upon risk allocation and financial cost-benefit as determined at a national level, but also 
informed by law and contract.  
 These legally derived factors include whether and how property taxes and taxes on 
personal seat licenses or sponsorships are avoidable, tax exemption of government bonds in the 
US, and the potential of ancillary real estate development to create additional revenue streams 
outside of league revenue sharing obligations to change a stadium value proposition. In some 
cases, public authority ownership can serve to obscure activities from public records and open 
meetings laws. In other instances, namely the UK, even if there were more governments willing 
 
110 Eryk Bagshaw, ‘Open to Abuse’: Experts Slam AFL’s Tax-free ‘Rort’, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Mar. 4, 
2018), https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/open-to-abuse-experts-slam-afl-s-tax-free-rort-20180304-
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to provide subsidies, European state aid laws for the present effectively restrict subsidies outside 
of economic distress, national stadiums, or major cultural events such as the Olympics. 
In Canada and Australia, there are similar monopoly leagues to the US, but these leagues 
do not extract stadium subsidies in the same way as in America. Canada has seen new and 
substantially renovated publicly owned stadiums mostly arise out of local and provincial 
governments viewing the stadium as a social good, and provincial governments recognizing an 
opportunity to win electoral favor with fans in such places as Regina, Winnipeg, or Hamilton. In 
MLS however, three Canadian cities did respond to monopoly incentives to provide a soccer 
specific stadium as a condition of successful expansion bids.111  
Australia has similar monopoly league power to Canada from an outcome perspective. 
While teams in the AFL and A-League relocate, the team licensing system, as well as the lack of 
viable alternative hosts willing to provide a superior stadium situation, lessens the extractive 
power of relocation best displayed in the US. Yet more often, unlike England (restricted by 
European state aid law), and somewhat like Canada, state governments have seen stadiums as 
public or social goods. As with stadiums like Canada’s BC Place, Australian state-owned 
stadiums are generally multitenant and multiuse.  
A commonality between all jurisdictions is the interest in ancillary real estate 
development on the part of some teams to improve the value proposition of a stadium. While the 
preference is for a publicly subsidized stadium where the club serves as a tenant on favorable 
terms, this preference is obtainable depending on the country and the market within the country. 
For club owners with the capacity to participate, ancillary development through a separate real 
estate company is a potentially lucrative source of revenue beyond event periods. In North 
America, these real estate revenues are further shielded from league revenue sharing. For some 
governments where clubs lack the potential or interest to develop property, the stadium can serve 
as a planning tactic to develop new land value tax revenues to recoup subsidy costs. For other 
governments with more limited means to directly subsidize stadiums out of pocket, their legal 
tools to assemble blighted lands such as eminent domain and land banking, as well as property 
tax abatements can close financial feasibility gaps. 
One other legal component present in each of the US, Canada, and Australia, but not 
England, is a strong federal structure. Considering the substantial role played by state or 
provincial governments in stadium finance and ownership in these countries, as well as the 
provision of public goods more generally, the constitutionally derived roles of sub-federal 
governments seem to contribute to the outcomes described in this paper.  
More broadly though, despite a move towards convergence in other legal and governance 
spheres, this article has shown that different political, regulatory, and economic incentives, 
grounded largely through law, have led to somewhat divergent stadium holding structures. These 
structures can be seen as a spectrum. At one end English stadiums, represented through the 
Premier League, are overwhelmingly privately owned by the same ultimate controlling parties as 
their resident clubs. At the other, American NFL stadiums are almost all publicly owned, with 
state level public authorities being the most common holding vehicle. Still, within these national 
 
111 Although Vancouver’s BC Place is not soccer specific, the Whitecaps’ MLS bid was premised on a waterfront 
soccer specific stadium that both the league and team latter deemed impractical given local planning restraints and 
the quality of the BC Place renovation. 
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realities, a number of legally grounded influences are seen across borders, namely the structuring 
of club-related holdings to best fit within tax, competition, land use, public authority, and public 
information laws, as well as internal league contracts. 
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